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9 D:i d tl: u • • ti: :i a J cot ir t : • : n imi t r e^ rerai bJ e error when, i t 
declined to strike si x exhibi ts suppor ting Olympus H. L 1 ] s" I lotion 
1
 -*- Summary '-jdgment when the six exhibits were authenticated and, 
created by the party wnr. s^yqr o exuude iiieni? 
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATIOI I 
MAY BE DETERMINATIVE 
Sec t ion 78-36-1 0 ( 1 ) , lit ah Code Ann. : 
If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer 
after ... default in the payment of rent, m e 
judgment shall also [in addition to ordering 
restitution] declare the forfeiture of the 
lease or agreement, (emphasis ad*ie^v-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The statutory authority which confers jurisdiction upon this 
Court to decide this appeal is §78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Ann. 
Olympus Hills brought this suit in November of 1985 to 
recover unpaid rent due under a long-term commercial lease from a 
guarantor of that lease, Michael Landes. In September of 1988, 
Landes filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. In response, Olympus 
Hills filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. After 
argument and briefing, the District Court granted Olympus Hills' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ruling that Landes was 
indeed a guarantor of the Lease and that the case should proceed 
to trial to determine the extent of his liability. 
The case was tried on February 9 and 10, 1989. Following 
the trial, the District Court granted Judgment against Landes in 
the total sum of $134,639.51. 
Landes appeals from that Judgment and from the District 
Court's prior determination of his liability to Olympus Hills as 
a guarantor of the Lease. Olympus Hills seeks affirmance of the 
Judgment and an award of costs and attorney's fees in defending 
against the appeal. 
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STATEMENT Of ' THE CASE 
P1 a i n 111 : ympus H ills Shoppi ng Cen ter , I. td. I ID Iympus • 
Hi lis") seeks . recover sums due under a long-term commercial 
J ease from -;,i guarantor of that lease, Defendant Michael Landes. 
("Landes"). 
In this brief, references .he record shall be cited as 
*'l;*« ) " . References l - script shrill I » 
as " (TR, _ _ ) " 
Olympu^ u *- * '*- ' •- *f * ">" o m t - o -
Mr S^mmarv jdgment * s e r i e s r *<- ; menis "f)r r e n ^ i p q 
^
f
 ' ° a c ^ r o p r n p r t K>^ ,-^
 IOj, o n e i e * r- jiiOtner * sen 
cermi i , . miarani-pp^ ^espors* ^ 
Andes' summa ' 'udgrrient mot 1 or, and SUI,H>V:' 1*3 -nemorandum. 
" T p - : ? i b a i e d d -• r * • . H- : it: 
.
 f
-r: . a a^ojjnipnt- *r s eve , ,. ,r .-: . -^  • 1 : s t r i c t 
: •*.;' , t. led ' .^-r Landes had q u a r a n t e e d th^ I * e s e a r c * ha f :he 
i s p 'ihniilil | i |ocepf | In I in in 1 I 1 11 dpt prill in 111 ll'liin" pvlpnt nil h 1 3 
L i a b i l i t y . The t r i a l r e s u l t e d in a $ 1 3 4 , 6 3 9 . 5 1 fudgriipnt in f a v o r 
,-' 01 ympus H . . -•. 
T J ••''"pssarv feu in 111  in In 1 n I I 111 d 1 11111 Ml I In 1 . in" 1 d 1 >.i I 
KT/ L a r d e s a.. I a r e a s f o l l o w s : 
1 - BageJ Nosh Holding Corp, agreed to J ease 
- • fr : 111 0] i 1 rip u in III 1 I I s f :: :i :  5 , 20 \ < 2a r tei : 1 1:1 Tin 1 e 
years :ater, mpus Hills threatened to ternii nate the Lease and 
evict Bagel Nosh because of delinquencies and non-performance. 
An arrangement was then made under which the Lease was allowed to 
remain in effect in exchange for Michael Landes and Sidney Seftel 
personally guaranteeing performance of the tenant's obligations 
under the Lease. (TR. 17-18? see also preamble to First 
Amendment to Lease, Exhibit 3-P, p.l). 
2. Three years later - in July of 1984 - Olympus Hills sued 
Bagel Nosh, Seftel and Landes to recover rent and other sums due 
under the Lease and to evict the tenant (Bagel Nosh) because of 
its nonpayment of rent. (R. 180-183; 345-9). That case, Third 
District Court No. C84-4355, was separate from and prior to this 
one. 
3. In that action, Olympus Hills alleged that on July 15, 
1981, Seftel and Landes executed a "First Amendment to Lease" in 
which they personally guaranteed performance and payment by the 
tenant under the Lease. (R. 346, para. 7). 
4. Before that case went to trial, Bagel Nosh filed a 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition. (R. 134). The Bankruptcy Court's 
jurisdiction over the debtor-in-possession automatically stayed 
further proceedings against the tenant. Bagel Nosh chose to 
affirm rather than reject the Olympus Hills Lease. Such 
affirmation was reflected in part by a stipulation filed with the 
Bankruptcy Court. That Stipulation provides in pertinent part: 
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3• Deb t o r , C r edi t o r [01 ^  mpus I I i11s1 a i i d 11 I e 1e a s e • 
guarantors have agreed to a repaymert schedule to 
satisfy both the arrearage due prior to the filing date 
herein, November 8, 1984, and to ensure the payment and 
performance of the current obligations as required by 11 
U•S.C. Sect ion 36 5(d)(3). 
• r ' if 
5 . T't le stipulation herein does not const I ti ite 
a waiver of any rights Creditor may have 
against the lease guarantors, and shall not be 
construed to waive any of the Creditor's 
rights against said guarantors as referenced 
in that certain civil action pending ; 
Third Judicial Court for Salt Lak** r'-->ur 
State of Utah, Civil No. C84-4355-
(R. 171-175 r 3 7 5 ) . 
;r December . - - *no^s - * R'a*-^ •--•ur* a r HM^^ 
mg 
testimor receiv:: a documentary * : ?*= ir.c insider mq 
i jas : , . .s 
CUSLJ: -r : ^ t o r n e - .- * r * U P Lota gn- • -,; * ; • S ; " ~ 
*ts judgment, * W P r^nr> ^yr^^ccN «-»-:>*-
Entry ^L •nib juagmeni in m e aroresaia sum 
against defendant/guarantors Sidney Seftel. - . 
Mike Landes fr r sums ;>*en in .mnection wit~ 
the subject lease does not terminate --v 
otherwise alter the continuing cb.igati.;^ 
the respect \ .-" oarties under their written 
agreemer-ti- - *r ea^r "*h^r. 
i <~ 
(R. 177-8). 
6. The Judgment was supported by Findings of Fact, 
including the following: 
3. On or about July 15, 1981, the parties 
executed a "First Amendment to Lease" in which 
defendants Sidney Seftel and Mike Landes 
agreed, inter alia, to personally guarantee 
performance and payment by the tenant under 
the terms of the aforesaid lease agreement. 
(R. 181). 
7. The Judgment was also supported by Conclusions of 
Law, including the following: 
1. Defendants Sidney Seftel and Mike Landes, 
as guarantors of all payments and other 
performance obligations of the lessee under 
the lease agreement, are jointly and severally 
personally liable for the unpaid, past-due 
obligations owed thereunder, including some 
$28,366.80 in unpaid rent, common area 
maintenance fees, merchant association dues 
and property taxes. 
*** 
3. The reduction to judgment against 
guarantors Sidney Seftel and Mike Landes of 
the past-due unpaid sums owed in connection 
with the Bagel Nosh lease does not terminate 
the lease. Whatever obligations the lessee, 
its assignees, and the guarantors have in 
connection with the lease and/or occupancy of 
the subject premises shall continue and are 
not cut off or otherwise affected by the trial 
and resulting judgment entered herein. 
(R. 180 - 183). 
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8 -; • 3 
Conclusions o. ..aw signeo bf Judge W: - .nson were aprr /^ as to 
form by Daniel W J ackson, acting as attorney for defendant . 
. -y- "Ilh" J ; 8 1 83) . 
9 • Neither Landes nor Seftel appealed fr om the Judgment 
entered by Judge Wi Ik j nson or moved to set I t asi de. 
10• Landes r esides and owns assets i i l New Yor k WI len 
01 y mp u s H i 11 s c ommenc ed e f f o r t s t o en foree t he J" u d gmen t a g a i n s t 
hiim there, Lanuli1" s i qi IHMI III M" f i dav i I lm h n Ik) m m 11 h, < n n f ^ s n m . 
III his A t t i d a v H , Landes acknowledged I he validity ot the III ah 
Judgment "for a debt due to (1)1 ympus", consented to entry of the 
Ji i 3gmei i t i i: l t I = i • "! r, :: >t I :: a i i 3 j : r ::  i i mi s e 3 t ::  j ; • a 3 t l : me :iiel:: t j n 
i 1 i s t a l l m e n t s . (R. 1 8 5 - 1 8 8 ) . 
1 1. Landes pai d t h e p r i or Judgment. a s a g r e e d . A S a t i s -
f a- ::  l:::li < :>i 1 :: II: ] \ 1 3gmei it 1 = 5 i iJI } ei iter e :i :ii 1: 1 C8 1 4 3 5 5 
12 . During t h e pendency of Bage l N o s h ' s b a n k r u p t c y a c t i o n , 
01 igoi ng r e n t and o t h e r J e a s e ob] I g a t i o n s were pa i d by 1 .andes , 
t i ir 01 igt 1 t ii s coi 11 ise] a s ] a t e a s May of ] 985 (R 1 9 5 - ] 9 9 ) . 
1 3 . On September 9, ] 985 , Landes1 ' a t t o r n e y w r o t e a l e t t e r t o 
0] ympus Hi 1 Is f m i m s e 1 rirknow 1 e d q i n g t h a t t h e 01 ympi as I Li ] ] 3 3 e a 3' 2 
h.nl 11 1 , H^. MI nil 11 1 1 in
 IP l. in i j r n i i i la ted and i n d i c a t i n g t h a t hi s 
r ] i e n t s "would 1 ike t o I IP r e l e a s e d from their1 ' o b l i g a t i o n s \ mder 
L [ i e m # m j _ e a s e » # | R - 3 ; y ) # 
i O 
14. On October 8, 1985, a Plan of Reorganization and 
Disclosure Statement were filed in the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy 
action by Landes' counsel. (R. 330 - 429). The Plan identifies 
Michael Landes as one of its proponents. The Plan acknowledges 
that Landes and Seftel "are the personal guarantors on certain 
debt obligations held by the company". (R. 420). The Disclosure 
Statement identifies Bagel Nosh's leasehold interest at the 
Olympus Hills Shopping Center as an asset of the estate (R. 
392-3). The Disclosure Statement also lists Olympus Hills as an 
unsecured creditor owed $24,849.68. (R. 398). The Disclosure 
Statement also acknowledges the continuing presence of personal 
property, including bagel-making equipment, at the Olympus Hills 
premises. (R. 402). 
15. At the trial in this action, Olympus Hills presented 
evidence that Landes owed some $321,132.54 in past-due unpaid 
rent, restoration expenses and attorney's fees. (TR. 10). Landes 
contended that he owed nothing because, among other reasons, 
actions in Bagel Nosh's bankruptcy proceeding terminated his 
obligations as guarantor of the Lease. The trial court rejected 
all of Landes' arguments that he owed nothing, but substantially 
discounted Olympus Hills' claim. The trial court awarded Olympus 
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Argument IV; Landes* argument that bankruptcy law protects him 
from liability is groundless and unavailing because: 1) as 
Landes' own bankruptcy expert testified, even a "termination" of 
the Lease vis a vis the debtor would not affect the obligations 
of a guarantor; and 2) under bankruptcy lawf the Lease was 
neither "rejected" nor "terminated". 
A. Even a "termination" of the Lease vis A vis the debtor in 
bankruptcy would not affect the obligations of a Guarantor. 
B. Under bankruptcy law, the Lease was neither rejected nor 
terminated. 
C. Landes* opaque assertions based on Section 24.02 of the 
Lease are inaccurate. 
Argument V: Res judicata bars Landes from asserting any defenses 
in this suit which were or could have been asserted in the prior 
action. 
Argument VI: Collateral estoppel bars Landes from denying his 
status as guarantor. 
Argument VII: The Judgment in C84-4355 was a "final" Judgment 
entitled to be given res judicata effect. 
A. The Judgment in C84-4355 is as "final" as the law requires 
it to be for issue and claim preclusion purposes. 
B. The Judgment in C84-4355 was "final" because it did in fact 
determine the rights and liabilities of all the parties and 
reserved nothing for future determination. 
Argument VIII; Although satisfaction of the prior Judgment 
should have foreclosed Landes from presenting his defenses to 
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Argument XI: There is no evidence in the record that Landes paid 
the prior Judgment "involuntarily". Moreover Landes could have 
appealed, but chose not to. 
Argument XII: The filing of the post-trial affidavit attempting 
to inform the trial court of a Utah bankruptcy judge's view on 
the bankruptcy law question raised by Landes does not constitute 
reversible error because: 1) there is no indication the court 
considered it; 2) the trial court's decision was based on other 
grounds; 3) the affidavit concerned a matter of law, not of 
fact; and 4) the affidavit contained no more hearsay than Mr. 
Leta's testimony. 
Argument XIII: Landes' Argument Thirteen is frivolous and 
illustrates his propensity to misstate facts and grasp at 
meritless technicalities. 
THE ARGUMENTS IN THIS BRIEF ARE STRUCTURED AND NUMBERED TO 




THERE IS ABUNDANT UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT 
OLYMPUS HILLS TOOK COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE STEPS 
TO MITIGATE ITS LOSSES. THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD 
OF $75,000-00 FOR LOSS OF RENTALS WAS CONSERVATIVE 
IN LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE UPHELD-
A. Olympus Hills' Rent Loss Under the Lease as of the Time 
of Trial was $134,424.88-
At trial, uncontroverted evidence was presented that the amount 
owed under the Lease for rent, common area maintenance and 
monthly promotional fees totalled $134,424-88- (TR. 23-25). 
This evidence was not rebutted, questioned or controverted. 
For some reason, the District Court decided to award Olympus 
Hills only the rent which accrued during the two year period 
ending June of 1987, totalling $75,000. The Court gave no 
indication as to the basis for its substantial discount. 
B. The Standard of Proof for Mitigation of Damages by a 
Landlord is "Reasonable Mitigation Efforts Only". 
In Reid v- Mutual of Omaha Ins- Co-, 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1989), this Court was "faced with the question of whether Utah 
law imposes a duty upon landlords to mitigate their damage by 
reletting premises after a tenant has wrongfully vacated and 
defaulted on the covenant to pay rent." 776 P.2d at 903- After 
noting a split of authority on the question, this Court carefully 
considered several justifications other jurisdictions have 
advanced in support of the "traditional rule" which does not 
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require landlords to mitigate. One justification noted by this 
Court is the unfairness of allowing a breaching party 
to force on the innocent landlord an 
affirmative duty to seek out new tenants and 
perhaps let the premises to tenants not 
entirely suitable.... 
776 P.2d at 904. In considering this justification, this Court 
noted: 
... [Tjhere is some validity to the concern 
that the breaching party should not be able to 
force its landlord to seek other tenants on 
pain of losing bargained-for rents. However, 
we think this point is outweighed by the 
policy arguments in favor of the modern rule, 
and we think any unfairness to the landlord 
can largely be eliminated by careful 
application of a rule requiring reasonable 
mitigation efforts only, (emphasis added). 
776 P. 2d at 905. This Court went on to hold that a landlord has 
an obligation to take "commercially reasonable steps to mitigate 
its losses". 776 P.2d at 906-
A landlord, then, must "take positive steps reasonably 
calculated to effect a reletting of the premises". The standard 
is one of "objective commercial reasonableness": 
A landlord is obligated to take such steps as 
would be expected of a reasonable landlord 
letting out a similar property in the same 
market conditions, [citations omitted]. 
Obviously, the objective commercial 
reasonableness of mitigation efforts is a fact 
question that depends heavily on the 
particularities of the property and the 
relevant market at the pertinent point in 
time, [citations omitted]. 
776 P.2d at 907. 
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C. By Cumulative, Quality Evidence, Olympus Hills Met its 
Burden^ by Proving that it took Commercially Reasonable 
Steps to Mitigate its Losses. 
The District Court found that Olympus Hills attempted to 
relet the premises. (Findings of Fact No. 14, R. 752). It also 
found that although Olympus Hills "had opportunities to lease the 
premises for a short term such as three years to a mom and pop 
operation," it refused to relet under such circumstance because 
such "prospective mom and pop tenants did not meet [its] 
criteria." (R. 752). Somewhat inexplicably, the District Court 
included among its conclusions of law the conclusion that 
"The Plaintiff did not use its best efforts to relet the 
premises." (R. 753). The recent holding of this Court does not 
require a landlord to use "best efforts". It requires a landlord 
to take "commercially reasonable" steps to effect a reletting of 
the premises. The fact that the District Court awarded 
$75,000.00 for unpaid rents is an indication that it believed 
Olympus Hills did in fact take commercially reasonable steps to 
relet. 
An award of damages must be upheld if there is evidence in 
the record to support it. Cowen and Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer 
Co., 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984); Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499 
(Utah 1976). And a reviewing Court should affirm a trial court's 
award whenever it can do so on a proper ground, even though not 
This case was tried five months before the Reid decision was 
handed down. Query: is it fair to hold Olympus Hills to a 
burden of which it had no notice? See Malan v. Lewis, 676 P.2d 
661, 667 (Utah 1984). 
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the ground the trial court relied on in its ruling. Bill Nay & 
Sons Excavating v. Neeley Const. Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984) • 
In this case, there is abundant, cumulative evidence that Olympus 
Hills actly reasonably and prudently in trying to mitigate its 
losses. 
During the two year period ending April, 1987, Del Webb 
Realty was employed as manager of the shopping center. (TR. 
134). Throughout that time, Michael C. Gardner was the leasing 
manager. In addition to overseeing efforts to lease the Bagel 
Nosh space, he was personally involved in efforts to secure a new 
tenant. During that period, meetings were held weekly to discuss 
possible new tenants (R. 149-150). Among the restaurant 
operations Mr. Gardner and others attempted to interest in the 
Bagel Nosh space were the Sizzler, Ponderosa, Marie Calendar's, 
Delia Fontana, Godfather's Pizza, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Dee's 
Family Restaurant and Studebaker's. (TR. 29, 150, 139). Other, 
non-restaurant operations were also approached, including 
Sterling Furniture, Ernst Hardware and Shopko. (TR. 150, 139). 
Approximately 30 tenants were actively approached to re-lease the 
premises. (TR. 139). 
Mr. Gardner's impression was that Olympus Hills was genuinely 
interested in reletting the space. (TR. 151). This impression 
was based on numerous meetings with Olympus Hills principals in 
which strategies to lease the space were formed. Mr. Gardner's 
company prepared and disseminated a brochure including pictures, 
demographic information, floor plan, etc. in an effort to market 
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the space• Many of the prospective tenants preferred to locate 
space elsewhere in the Salt Lake valley. A major obstacle was 
the poor physical condition in which Bagel Nosh left the space. 
(TR. 152). 
Del Webb's property manager in charge of the entire Olympus 
Hills Shopping Center was David W. Pugh. He testified that Bagel 
Nosh left large pylon signs in front of the premises and, despite 
repeated requests, refused to remove them. The signs were still 
present as of the time of trial. (TR. 136). He also testified 
that Bagel Nosh had left its bagel-making machinery and other 
substantial items of property in the premises until 
approximately February of 1986. (TR. 135-6). Great effort was 
made to get the Bagel Nosh principals to remove the equipment so 
that the space could be relet. (TR. 136). After the equipment 
was finally removed, considerable expense was incurred in 
attempting to clean up the space. (TR. 138). 
During the two years Mr. Pugh was property manager, he never 
received any information that Olympus Hills did not want the 
space to be relet or was not interested in actively pursuing a 
new tenant. (TR. 140). On the contrary, he testified that good 
faith efforts were continually made to acquire a new tenant 
throughout the time he was the property manager. (TR. 140). 
Olympus Hills1 general partner, Richard Skankey, also so 
testified. (TR. 29, 32, lines 16-20). 
In April, 1987, Olympus Hills hired Coldwell Banker as its 
new property manager. One of its leasing agents was Don Michael 
Nielson. Mr. Nielson had been involved in serious efforts to 
secure a tenant for the Bagel Nosh space even before Coldwell 
Banker's appointment to manage the property. In the Summer of 
1985, Mr. Nielson became aware that the Sizzler national 
restaurant chain was interested in opening a restaurant in the 
Holladay area. (TR. 155). From that point on, he engaged in 
good faith negotiations to get Sizzler into the Bagel Nosh space. 
His motivation was purely pecuniary. If he succeeded, he would 
receive a large commission as the procuring leasing agent. (TR. 
156). Mr. Nielson*s work with Sizzler extended over a two and 
one-half year period. (TR. 156). Ultimately, it was learned 
that Sizzler could not use the space without substantial 
renovation. The cost of the desired renovations was prohibitive. 
(TR. 33). Mr. Nielson testified that he and his company have 
continued efforts to make profitable use of the space vacated by 
Bagel Nosh. (TR. 158). 
It is true that evidence was presented at trial to the effect 
that Olympus Hills may have been able to relet the space to a 
small, unproven tenant on a short term basis. However, there are 
several commercially reasonable reasons why Olympus Hills might 
choose not to lease the space to such a tenant. Olympus Hills' 
witnesses so testified. 
Under existing economic conditions, allowing an unproven or 
"morn and pop" tenant to occupy the space would constitute a risky 
financial gamble. The chances that the tenant would fail within 
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a few months would be high. The expenses of making the space 
suitable for that tenant would have been wasted and new renovation 
costs would have to be incurred. (See TR. 75-76). 
Besides the loss of capital involved in re-renovating the 
space, there are other sound reasons for Olympus Hills' natural 
reluctance to lease to such a tenant: 
... besides being funds that you're out when 
that tenant comes and goes, there is also a 
great deal of other involvement, hassle, 
negotiations, legal activities, that are not 
very productive; plus it makes it difficult to 
get another tenant if you put in weak tenants 
that keep turning over. 
(TR. 84). 
That the re-renovating expenses and rent shortfall could 
ultimately be charged to Landes under his commitment to guarantee 
the 20 year Bagel Nosh lease hardly increases the commercial 
attractiveness of reletting the space to a risky new tenant. 
This case is a solemn testament to the unproductive "hassle" and 
almost prohibitive cost of attempting to recover from a 
guarantor. (See Exhibit 31-P; TR. 162-164). 
There is no evidence that Olympus Hills deliberately decided 
against reletting the space in order to make its guarantor 
suffer. On the contrary, allowing the space to remain vacant 
caused Olympus Hills itself to suffer. The vacancy made it 
more difficult to attract and retain viable tenants throughout 
the Center. (TR. 85). However, it still made more sense to wait 
for a solid tenant and reasonable terms than to rent the space to 
an unreliable short term tenant. 
The evidence showed that leasing the space to an unproven, 
short term tenant would not be commercially reasonable. Olympus 
Hills tried mightily, but unsuccessfully, to relet the space to a 
tenant and on terms which made economic sense. It should not be 
penalized for making decisions which, based on an objective view 
of the facts, were commercially reasonable. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE: 1) LANDES IS A PARTY 
TO THE LEASE, AS AMENDED; 2) ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE 
AMONG THE CHARGES LANDES AGREED TO GUARANTEE; AND 
3) LANDES' LIABILITY FOR OLYMPUS HILLS' FEES IN 
ENFORCING THE LEASE WAS JUDICIALLY ESTABLISHED 
IN THE PRIOR CASE (C84-4355). 
The "First Amendment to Lease" which Landes executed (Exhibit 
3-P) incorporates itself into the Lease Agreement and 
incorporates the Lease Agreement into itself. The document 
refers to itself at paragraph eight as "this Amended Lease 
Agreement". In paragraph one, Landes expressly agrees to 
"personally guarantee the terms of this First Amended Lease". 
Paragraph two provides that "Article I of the Lease is amended by 
adding after the words 'name of guarantor' the names Seftel and 
Landes". Paragraph eight of the document expressly amends the 
underlying Lease by adding to it a Section 29.19 specifically 
providing that Seftel and Landes personally guarantee the terms 
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of the "Amended Lease Agreement". In short, the First Amendment 
to Lease which Landes signed makes him a party to the Lease 
Agreement. 
As a party to the Lease and a guarantor of the tenants1 
leasehold obligations, Landes is liable for the rent, 
assessments, damages and fees for which the Agreement makes 
provision. The attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the lease 
are among the charges Landes agreed to guarantee. 
Over a year before this action was commenced, Olympus Hills 
sued and obtained a Judgment against Landes for rent owed under 
the Lease. That Judgment included an assessment of attorney's 
fees. (R. 178). The attorney's fees award against Landes was 
supported by express findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
(R. 182, para. 5 of Findings and para. 2 of Conclusions). 
Principles of collateral estoppel, res judicata and judicial 
estoppel preclude Landes from denying his liability for the 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Olympus Hills in enforcing 
his obligations under the contract. See Arguments V through VII, 
infra. 
At trial, Olympus Hills presented testimonial and documentary 
evidence that its reasonable attorney's fees incurred in 
enforcing Landes' contractual obligations in this action were 
$20,925.15. (TR. 162-164; Exhibit 31-P). Landes offered no 
rebuttal evidence. The District Court awarded $16,667.00. 
The District Court's award of attorney's fees should stand. 
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ARGUMENT III 
THERE IS AMPLE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE WHICH 
WOULD SUPPORT A RESTORATION EXPENSE AWARD FAR 
IN EXCESS OF THE $15,000-00 AWARDED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONSERVATIVE AWARD 
SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
Landes1 Argument III rests entirely on his notion that he can 
be held liable only for the cost of restoring the space Mto its 
condition before the Lessee took possession". (Landes1 Brief, p. 
16). Landes contends that the evidence on the condition of the 
2 
premises when Bagel Nosh moved in was skimpy and therefore no 
award for restoration expense should have been made. Neither the 
2 
Landes1 assertion that no such evidence was presented is 
untrue. Olympus Hills' general partner gave testimony as 
follows: 
MQ. Okay. My question is: Do you have a 
figure or have you had someone calculate a 
figure of what it would cost to take the 
premises not for just Sizzler or Pancho Villa, 
but back to the condition it was before this 
Lease was signed? 
A. Yeah. I think that number I gave -
Q. You think it would cost $175? 
A. $175,000.00. 
A. I mean $175,000.00 to remove the building 
back to a shell? A. To where it was when the 
tenant - when Bagel Nosh moved in." (TR. 93). 
As to the condition of the premises when Bagel Nosh moved in, Mr. 
Skankey gave explicit testimony that flooring, wall covers, 
ceiling, lighting, plumbing, electrical, heating and air 
conditioning fixtures were present, as well as some partitions 
and counters. It was more than a bare wall "shell". (TR. 53-54; 
95-96). 
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Lease or controlling case law supports Landes' notion. The 
Lease provides with abundant clarity that the owner: 
may from time to time without terminating this 
Lease, make such alterations and repairs as 
may be necessary in order to relet the 
premises (emphasis added). 
(Exhibit 2, Section 24.02, p. 23).The Lease goes on to provide 
that the expenses incurred in so preparing the space for 
reletting may be charged to the tenant (or, here, guarantor) by 
allowing the owner to deduct such costs before applying the new 
tenant's rent proceeds toward the defaulting tenant's continuing 
obligation under the Lease. (Id.). 
The Lease also provides elsewhere that the tenant is 
responsible for all repairs and maintenance "including but not 
limited to ... windows, plate glass ... the mechanical, plumbing, 
heating, air conditioning, ventilating and electrical equipment 
and systems; partitions, and all other fixtures, appliances and 
facilities furnished by owner". (Exhibit 2-P, Section 14.02, p. 
15). If the tenant fails to make such repairs, the owner may 
make them and "upon completion thereof, tenant shall pay owner's 
cost of making such repairs plus 20% for overhead". (Exhibit 
2-P, Section 14.03, p. 15). 
Even if the Lease did not entitle Olympus Hills to recover 
its costs of making the space relettable, Utah case law does. 
This Court has recently held as a matter of common law that a 
landlord is entitled to recover from a breaching tenant the 
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"costs of repairs or alterations of the premises reasonably 
necessary to successfully relet them". Reid v. Mutual of Omaha 
Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 907 (Utah 1989). 
In short, Olympus Hills' measure of damage for restoration 
expense under both the Lease and Utah case law is the cost 
necessary to make the premises relettable. The evidence Olympus 
Hills produced at trial was precisely on point. 
Expert witness Roger P. Knight testified without 
controversion that the cost of restoring the premises to a 
condition that would be suitable for a prospective tenant to 
begin making modifying improvements for its own use would be 
$165,000.00 (TR. 126-34). Mr. Knight testified that 24 
photographs admitted into evidence as Exhibits 4 - 2 8 accurately 
depict the terrible condition in which the premises were left 
after Bagel Nosh moved out. (TR. 131). He testified, and the 
photographs demonstrate, that Bagel Nosh's attachments to the 
heating, air conditioning, electrical and plumbing fixtures were 
"ripped out" in such a way as to increase the cost of restoring 
the premises. (TR. 129-131). He further testified that it would 
cost "somewhere in the neighborhood of $250,000.00" to raze the 
building and replace it. (TR. 131). 
Landes offered no rebuttal evidence. Landes did not deny 
that the photographs accurately reflect the condition in which 
Bagel Nosh left the premises when it vacated. The record is 
devoid of any evidence or even argumentary basis for reducing the 
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restoration element of Olympus Hills' damage from $165,000.00 to 
$15,000.00. The District Court's $15,000.00 award was 
conservative in the extreme. It should be upheld, if not 
liberally increased. 
ARGUMENT IV 
LANDES' ARGUMENT THAT BANKRUPTCY LAW PROTECTS HIM 
FROM LIABILITY IS GROUNDLESS AND UNAVAILING BECAUSE: 
1) AS LANDES' OWN BANKRUPTCY EXPERT TESTIFIED, EVEN A 
"TERMINATION" OF THE LEASE VIS A VIS THE DEBTOR WOULD 
NOT AFFECT THE OBLIGATIONS OF A GUARANTOR; AND 2) UNDER 
BANKRUPTCY LAW, THE LEASE WAS NEITHER "REJECTED" NOR 
"TERMINATED". 
A. Even a "Termination" of the Lease Vis A Vis the Debtor in 
Bankruptcy Would Not Affect the Obligations of a Guarantor. 
Landes argues that Bagel Nosh "rejected" the Olympus Hills 
Lease by failing to properly affirm it and that such rejection 
constitutes a termination of the Lease. Landes admits at page 21 
of his brief that there is a "distinct split of authority in the 
federal courts" concerning whether the rejection of a lease 
constitutes a termination or merely a breach of the lease. At 
trial, the Court allowed Landes to call a bankruptcy attorney, 
David Leta, to instruct the Court on bankruptcy law. 
Mr. Leta gave his view as to the effect of a debtor's 
rejection of a lease. Although he could produce no Utah 
bankruptcy case supporting his view, he gave his opinion that the 
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"majority" of courts which had dealt with the issue recently have 
concluded that rejection of a lease constitutes termination. His 
testimony on this point, however, was rendered immaterial by his 
later clear testimony that even a "termination" of the lease, as 
far as the debtor's obligation is concerned, does not affect 
obligations of a guarantor of the lease: 
Q. ... following rejection of the Lease by 
the bankrupt tenant, what rights to damages 
or other recovery would the landlord have 
against the guarantors because you said again 
the tenant is defined by the Bankruptcy Code. 
Does the Bankruptcy Code define the 
liability of the guarantors? 
A. No, no. The Bankruptcy Code - and this is 
where A. J. Mackay may have some application. 
The remedies in bankruptcy are unique to 
those whose seek it, and those who do not 
seek it don't get the benefit of those who 
do. So, it doesn't have an effect on the 
guarantor's liability, but there this case -
guarantor's liability would be fixed by the 
guarantee for the term of whatever instrument 
it was guaranteeing. The language of the 
Lease, for example, or the language of the 
guarantee would determine the liability of 
the guarantor. 
The Court: If I understand you correctly, he takes out 
bankruptcy, the guarantor still would be liable -
The Witness: Could still be liable under the Lease based on 
whatever the Lease provided or whatever the 
guarantee provided, (emphasis added). 
(TR. 237-8). 
Later, Landes' counsel confirmed the accuracy of the Court's 
understanding that rejection and even "termination" of the Lease 




... and so he's absolutely right and 
we now direct ourselves to the terms 
of the Lease and the liability of the 
tenant upon termination of the Lease. 
But the tenant may not be liable 
because of the bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
Mr. Jackson: That's correct. 
The Court: But the guarantors could be liable 
for the full time, full 20 years. 
Mr. Jackson: That's correct, and we have to look 
at the terms of the Lease. 
* * • 
The Court: ... it appears to me based upon Mr. 
Leta's testimony and from what I have 
been able to - from your arguments 
and testimony here that the 
guarantors, pursuant to their 
guarantee, are liable for the rents. 
It is now an issue as to what the 
extent of the liability is as to that 
Lease. 
Mr. Jackson: Exactly, as I see it. (emphasis 
added) 
(TR. 240, 267). 
In short, even if a majority of courts consider a rejection 
of a lease to be a "termination" and even if that view had 
been adopted by the bankruptcy courts in Utah (which it hasn't; 
See R. 701-2), such "termination" would not impact a guarantor's 
liability. The Trial Court's conclusion that the Bagel Nosh 
Bankruptcy proceedings did not affect the obligations of the 
non-bankrupt guarantor (Conclusion of Law No. 4, R. 753) is 
unassailable because it is based on the testimony of Landes' own 
bankruptcy expert. 
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B. Under Bankruptcy law, the Lease was Neither Rejected 
Nor Terminated. 
On page 19 of his brief, Landes argues that the Lease was 
rejected, by operation of bankruptcy law, on the 61st day 
following Bagel Nosh's bankruptcy filing because Bagel Nosh 
failed to assume it with requisite formality. In suggesting that 
the Lease was terminated by Bagel Nosh's failure to properly 
assume it, Landes cites at page 20 of his brief a Colorado case 
for the proposition that a debtor may not "unilaterally" assume a 
lease* Bagel Nosh did not assume the Lease "unilaterally"; it 
did so by means of a written stipulation signed by both itself 
and Olympus Hills and filed with the bankruptcy court well within 
60 days of the bankruptcy filing. (R. 171-175). 
Landes suggests that a lease cannot be assumed by conduct but 
only by a formal motion and order within 60 days of the filing of 
bankruptcy. This is simply contrary to controlling bankruptcy 
law in Utah. In In re By-rite Distributing, Inc., 55 B.R. 740 
(Bkrtcy. D.C. Utah 1985), Chief Judge Bruce Jenkins, ruling on an 
appeal from Utah's Bankruptcy Court, declared: 
The code does not specify how the trustee is 
to assume or reject a lease ... . 
*** 
The court concludes that the trustee assumes 
or rejects the lease within the meaning of 
§365(d)(4) when he makes up his mind to do so 
and communicates his decision in an 
appropriate manner, such as by filing a motion 
to assume. 
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55 B.R. at 743. Bagel Nosh made up its mind to assume the Lease 
by paying the post-petition obligations due under the Lease and 
by undertaking to retire the pre-petition rent arrearage. It 
communicated its decision by executing and persuading Olympus 
Hills to execute the formal stipulation filed with the Bankruptcy 
Court on December 31, 1984. 
In signing the bankruptcy stipulation, Olympus Hills gave up 
any contract right it initially may have had to declare the Lease 
terminated and evict its tenant. It agreed to allow the Lease to 
continue. All the parties, including Landes, recognized its 
continuation. Landes1 repeated attempts now to argue that the 
Lease was in fact terminated ought to disturb this Court. 
Even if Bagel Nosh could be deemed to have rejected the Lease, 
our research suggests Mr. Leta was in error in his assertion that 
the weight of recent authority holds with the "termination" view. 
The following post-1984 decisions hold that a rejection 
constitutes a breach, not a termination, of the lease: *Sharon 
Steel Corp. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp,, 872 F.2d 36, 
41 (3rd Cir. 1989); *Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal 
Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985); *In re 
Blackburn, 88 B.R. 273, 276 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Cal. 1988); *In re 
Picnic 'N Chicken, Inc., 58 B.R. 523, 525 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Cal. 
1986); *In re Storage Technology Corp., 53 B.R. 471, 475 (Bkrtcy. 
D. Colo. 1985); Societe Nationale Algerienne v. Distrigas Corp., 
80 B.R. 606, 608-09 (Bkrtcy. D. Mass. 1987); *In re Hardie, 100 
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B.R. 284, 285 (Bkrtcy. E.D. N.C. 1989); *In re Monqe Oil Corp., 
83 B.R. 305, 308 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Pa. 1988); and In re Silk Plants, 
Etc., 100 B.R. 360, 362 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Tenn. 1989). The 
asterisked opinions are particularly insightful in their analysis 
of the issue. See, also, In re A.J. Mackay Co., 50 B.R. 756 
(Bkrtcy<, D.C. Utah 1985); and Beconta, Inc. v. Schneider, 41 B.R. 
878 (Bkrtcy. D.C. Mich. 1984). 
C. Landes* Opaque Assertions based on Section 24.02 of the 
Lease are Inaccurate. 
At the conclusion of trial, Landes' counsel argued for the 
first time that somehow what happened in the bankruptcy court 
limits Olympus Hills' recovery rights to a formula supposedly set 
forth in Section 24.02 of the Lease. The argument counsel 
advances on this point might charitably be described as obscure. 
Section 24.02 expressly provides that the Landlord's re-entry 
and taking possession of the premises does not of itself 
constitute an election to terminate the Lease. The section then 
goes on to set forth a damage formula which may apply "in 
addition to any other remedies [the owner] may have ... should 
owner at any time terminate this Lease for any breach". (Exhibit 
2 at 23-24). The formula that Landes seeks to have applied and 
which he claims results in a finding of zero liability is 
inapplicable. Olympus Hills1 general partner repeatedly 
testified that he never elected to terminate the Lease. (TR. 24, 
86, 271 lines 20-25). 
In short, the argument and subarguments advanced on pages 18 
through 25 of Landes' brief are without merit. 
ARGUMENT V 
RES JUDICATA BARS LANDES FROM ASSERTING ANY 
DEFENSES IN THIS SUIT WHICH WERE OR COULD 
HAVE BEEN ASSERTED IN THE PRIOR ACTION. 
It is the strong policy of the law to prevent piecemeal 
litigation. That policy is served by the doctrine of res 
judicata which precludes the assertion of a defense which could 
have been raised in an earlier suit. This doctrine has long been 
recognized in Utah: 
[a] valid judgment for plaintiff is conclusive 
not only as to defenses which are set up and 
adjudicated, but also as to those which might 
have been raised, so that a defendant can 
neither set up such defense in a second action 
between the same parties nor in a further 
proceeding in the same action. Everill v. 
Swan, 20 Utah 56, 57 P. 716; 34 C.J. 856, 859. 
Utah Builders' Supply Co. v. Gardner, 39 P.2d 327, 328 (Utah 
1934). See also Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379 (Utah 
1974); Richards v. Hodson, 485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971); Todaro v. 
Gardner, 285 P.2d 839 (Utah 1955). As stated in Logan v. Utah 
Power & Light, 16 P.2d 1097, 1101 (1932): 
It is well settled that it is the duty of a 
party to interpose such defense as it may have 
to an action brought against it, and, if it 
fails to do so, the resulting judgment is 
conclusive against it as to all matters of 
defense which were or might have been 
interposed. 
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In the earlier action (C84-4355), Landes might have raised 
various defenses in an effort to establish that he was not a 
guarantor. He failed to do so. After the Court found him to be 
a guarantor, he acquiesced in such finding. He neither sought a 
new trial nor appealed from the finding. His status as guarantor 
became a "thing decided". Landes is barred from now attempting 
to undo the established fact of his guarantorship. 
ARGUMENT VI 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL BARS LANDES FROM DENYING 
HIS STATUS AS GUARANTOR. 
Collateral estoppel, referred to in Section 27 of the 
Restatement 2d of Judgments (1982) as the doctrine of issue 
preclusion, requires that: 
When an issue of fact or law is actually 
litigated and determined by a valid and final 
judgment, and the determination is essential 
to the judgment, the determination is 
conclusive in a subsequent action between the 
parties, whether on the same or a different 
claim. 
Id. 
This Court approvingly quoted the foregoing rule in Robertson 
v. Campbell, 647 P.2d 1226, 1230 n.l (Utah 1983). In that 
opinion, this Court held that collateral estoppel precludes 
relitigation 
of issues actually tried in a prior action, 
and it may be invoked even though the 
subsequent cause of action is different from 
the former. [Citations omitted] 
*** 
The applicability of collateral estoppel does 
not depend on whether the claims for relief are 
the same. Searle Bros, v. Searle, supra. 
What is critical is whether the issue that was 
actually litigated in the first suit was 
essential to resolution of that suit and is 
the same factual issue as that raised in a 
second suit. Id. 
647 P.2d at 1230. 
The four tests for the applicability of collateral estoppel 
are all met in this case. 1) An issue decided in the prior 
adjudication is identical to the issue presented in this action: 
namely, did Landes guarantee performance of the Bagel Nosh Lease? 
2) There was a final judgment on the merits. 3) The party 
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted (Landes) was a party 
to the prior adjudication. 4) The issue of Landes1 status as 
guarantor was competently, fully and fairly litigated in the first 
case. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered 
by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on January 25, 1985 in Case 
No. C84-4355 were binding upon the parties and upon Judge Rokich 
in this case. They are also binding on this Court. 
A critical issue decided in that case was whether Landes was 
personally liable as a guarantor of the tenant's lease 
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obligations* Judge Wilkinson found on the basis of evidence 
presented to him that Landes did guarantee the Bagel Nosh Lease. 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of Landes1 
liability as a guarantor of the Lease. Having been judicially 
established, his status as a guarantor may not be questioned nowo 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel aside, Landes' consistent 
subsequent actions acknowledging his liability as guarantor 
should preclude him from contesting his personal liability. 
Subsequent to the entry of judgment in the prior case, Landes 
consistently acknowledged his legal obligation to guarantee 
performance under the Lease. He acquiesced in the entry of the 
Judgment and, through his counsel, approved the Findings and 
Conclusions establishing his liability as guarantor. The 
Judgment Landes' counsel approved expressly stated that it "does 
not terminate or otherwise alter the continuing obligations'* of 
the guarantors. Landes chose not to appeal or otherwise contest 
that Judgment. He further acknowledged his liability as 
guarantor by confessing Judgment on the debt in New York and 
thereafter paying the Judgment. (R. 185-188). 
Landes later manifested his continuing liability as guarantor 
by paying portions of Bagel Nosh's continuing lease obligations 
through May of 1985. (R. 195-199). 
Landes' assertion that "a transcript of this proceeding does 
not exist" (Appellant's Brief, p. 30) is gratuitous. The trial 
was conducted "on the record". If Landes wanted a transcript, he 
could have ordered one from Judge Wilkinson's court reporter. 
Several months later - on September 9, 1985 - Landes1 
attorney wrote a letter to Olympus Hills1 counsel acknowledging 
that the Olympus Hills Lease had not, as of that time, been 
terminated and indicating that Bagel Nosh's principals (Landes, 
et al.) "would like to be released from their obligation under 
the ... Lease". (R. 379). 
One month later, Landes' counsel filed a Plan of 
Reorganization and Disclosure Statement in the Bagel Nosh 
Bankruptcy action. Landes is identified as one of the proponents 
of the Plan. The Plan identifies Landes as a personal guarantor 
(R. 420). 
Landes could not have acknowledged his liability as guarantor, 
more strongly than by these actions. 
The doctrine of "judicial estoppel" is often invoked by 
courts to prevent a litigant from alleging facts inconsistent 
with a position taken by that litigant in earlier litigation or 
from otherwise "playing fast and loose" with the judicial 
process. See IB Moore, Federal Practice, Section 405(8) at 239 
(2d Ed. 1978). See also Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162 
(4th Cir. 1982); Scarano v. New Jersey Central Railroad, 203 F.2d 
510 (3rd Cir. 1953). A litigant is not free to argue facts which 
contradict an earlier position whenever self-interest suggests a 
change. Judicial estoppel should bar Landes from denying he 
guaranteed the Lease. 
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ARGUMENT VII 
THE JUDGMENT IN C84-4355 WAS A "FINAL" JUDGMENT 
ENTITLED TO BE GIVEN RES JUDICATA EFFECT. 
A. The Judgment in C84-4355 is as "Final" as the Law 
Requires it to be for Issue and Claim Preclusion 
Purposes. 
Landes claims that neither res judicata nor collateral 
estoppel applies to the Judgment in C84-4355 because it was not a 
"final" judgment. This assertion is not supported by an analysis 
of the facts or the recognized authorities* 
Excellent authority holds: 
It is true that "finality" has sometimes been 
equated with "appealability" in the context of a 
particular case, [citations omitted]. However, 
"final" in the res judicata or collateral 
estoppel sense is not identical to "final" in 
the rule governing the jurisdiction of the 
appellate courts. [citations omitted]. An 
examination of the policies underlying res 
judicata and collateral estoppel and the 
requirement that judgments be "final" to be 
appealable show why this is so. Res judicata 
is not merely a matter of procedure inherited 
from a more technical era but is founded on the 
policy of preventing needless litigation, 
[citations omitted]. It is "a principle which 
seeks to bring litigation to an end and promote 
certainty in legal relations", [citations 
omitted]. 
*** 
It follows, therefore, that "final" for res 
judicata purposes must be construed in the 
light of the considerations of that doctrine, 
rather than be automatically equated with 
"final" in the final judgment rule. 
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Sherman v. Jacobsen, 247 F.Supp. 261 (S.D. N.Y. 1965). 
Cases in accord include: Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining 
Co., 297 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 986, 82 
S.Ct. 601, 7 L.Ed.2d 524 (1962); also Zednoak v. Glidden Co., 327 
F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 377 U.S. 934, 84 S.Ct. 1338, 12 
L.Ed.2d 298 (1964); U. S. ex rel DiGianqiermo v. Regan, 528 F.2d 
1265 (2d Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 426 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 3172, 
49 L.Ed.2d 1187 (1976). 
This Court has approvingly cited the Restatement 2d of 
Judgments. See, e.g. Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 at 
1230 n.l (Utah 1983). Section 13 of the Restatement provides: 
The rules of res judicata are applicable only 
when a final judgment is rendered. However, 
for purposes of issue preclusion (as 
distinguished from merger and bar), "final 
judgment" includes any prior adjudication of 
an issue in another action that is determined 
to be sufficiently firm to be accorded 
conclusive effect. 
Significantly, comment b to this section states in pertinent 
part: 
Thus when res judicata is in question, a 
judgment will ordinarily be considered final in 
respect to a claim (or a separate part of a 
claim. . .) if it is not tentative, 
provisional or contingent and represents the 
completion of all steps in the adjudication of 
the claim by the court, short of any steps by 
way of execution or enforcement, that may be 
consequent upon the particular kind of 
adjudication. 
Judge Wilkinson's Judgment was in no sense tentative, 
provisional or contingent. He did not reserve for future 
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determination any issue of law or fact essential to the 
4 
Judgment. The Judgment was specific in amount, final in form 
and well-defined in scope. 
As the renowned Judge Friendly has stated, "finality" for 
purposes of issue and claim preclusion 
may mean little more than that the litigation 
of a particular issue has reached such a stage 
that a court sees no really good reason for 
permitting it to be litigated again. 
Lummus, supra, 297 F.2d at 89. 
According to Judge Friendly, "general expressions that only 
final judgments can ever have collateral estoppel effect are 
considerably overstated". See Kurland v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 343 F.2d 625, 628-629 n.l (2d Cir. 1965). The 
enlightened, widely-accepted view now is: 
To be "final" for purposes of collateral 
estoppel the decision need only be immune, as 
a practical matter, to reversal or amendment. 
Miller Brewing v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 996 
(7th Cir. 1979). Judge Wilkinson's decision in C84-4355 is 
certainly immune, as a practical matter, to reversal or 
amendment. No attempt was made to set it aside or have 
it amended. Nor was any request made to have it certified under 
Rule 54(b). No appeal was sought. 
Any question over whether Judge Wilkinson was on notice that 
the Bankruptcy Court's automatic stay precluded him from 
exercising jurisdiction over Bagel Nosh Holding Corp. is 
dispelled by the face of his Judgment, which declares in its 
preamble: "An officer of defendant Bagel Nosh Holding Corp. was 
present but indicated to the Court that he was not present as a 
participant, his corporation having filed bankruptcy." 
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Landes' satisfaction of the Judgment, more than any 
other practical matter could have done, rendered it "immune to 
reversal or amendment". A judgment cannot be any more final than 
when it is fully paid, A facially valid satisfaction is a 
complete bar to any effort to alter or amend a judgment* Morris 
North American, Inc. v. King, 430 So.2d 592 (Fla. App. 1983). 
See also Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Kriz, 515 So.2d 350 (Fla. App. 
1987). 
In Olsen v. Bd. of Ed. of Granite Sch. Dist., 571 P.2d 1336 
(Utah 1977), this Court held that the trial court's judgment in a 
condemnation case absolutely barred subsequent litigation of 
issues covered by the judgment after the condemnation award it 
granted had been fully paid. 
B. The Judgment in C84-4355 was "Final" Because it 
did in fact Determine the Rights and Liabilities 
of all the Parties and Reserved Nothing for Future 
Determination. 
In Bernard v. Attebury, 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981), this Court 
stated: 
In deciding whether the court's order ... 
constitutes a final judgment and as such 
invokes the doctrine of res judicata we are 
guided by Rule 54(b) ... (emphasis added) 
629 P.2d at 895. Expressly, this Court chose to be "guided" by 
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Rule 54(b), not "bound" by it. As pointed out supra, there is 
persuasive authority that Rule 54(b)'s definition of finality 
need not be dispositive in determining whether a claim is barred 
by res judicatao 
Even assuming Rule 54(b) contains the controlling standard 
for when a judgment is sufficiently "final" to merit res judicata 
effect, close analysis of the Judgment in C84-4355 reveals that 
it was in fact "final", even under this standard. 
No claim asserted in the prior action was left unresolved 
or unforeclosed by Judge Wilkinson's ruling. Clearly, the 
Judgment did not leave unresolved the question of whether the 
Bagel Nosh Lease was terminated. Judge Wilkinson expressly found 
the Lease remained in effect. This finding was essential to his 
ruling that the guarantors were liable for the unpaid rent and 
other charges due under the Lease through December 10, 1984. If 
the Lease had been terminated back in July of 1984, as Landes now 
contends, the guarantors could not have been held liable for the 
tenant's Lease obligations through December 10, 1984. The 
Judgment expressly declares that the Bagel Nosh Lease and the 
guarantor's liability under it were continuing. (R. 177-8). 
The issue of Bagel Nosh's unlawful detainer status was 
foreclosed by the Court's finding that the lease was still in 
effect. Having been granted Judgment for obligations owed under 
the Lease through December 10, 1984, Olympus Hills could not 
later seek a judicial determination that the Lease had been 
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terminated the prior summer. The Judgment disposed of the 
unlawful detainer claim. It left no claim resolved. 
This Court's holding and rationale in Attebury, supra, are 
contained in the penultimate paragraph of the opinion on page 
896. Illuminatingly, that paragraph ends with a footnote in 
which this Court quotes approvingly from its opinion in State v. 
Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59 P. 553 (1899): 
In Booth we explain; "... where the rights of 
the parties in an action, or a distinct and 
independent branch thereof, are determined by 
the court, and nothing is reserved for future 
determination, except what may be necessary to 
enforce the judgment or decision, the judgment 
is final." 
629 P.2d at 896. 
Unlike in Attebury, the Judgment in C84-4355 "reserved 
nothing for future determination". It resolved all the issues 
raised in the pleadings. In Attebury, the unlitigated claim was 
the very claim the res judicata proponent wanted to have barred. 
Here, the allegedly unlitigated question (whether Bagel Nosh was 
in unlawful detainer) was actually resolved by the Judgment. The 
Judgment's declaration that the Lease was continuing meant, ipso 
facto, that Bagel Nosh was not in unlawful detainer. 
Freegard v. First Western Nat. Bank, 738 P.2d 614 (Utah 
1987), cited by Landes, is unhelpful. There, the court simply 
found that a judgment dismissing one of several defendants in a 
prior suit was not a final judgment because it left pending and 
unresolved claims against the other defendants. As noted, Judge 
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Wilkinson's Judgment did not leave any pending unresolved claims. 
It foreclosed any further claim by Olympus Hills against Bagel 
Nosh in C84-4355. 
Landes contends, however, that Galloway v. Mangum, 744 P. 2d 
1365 (Utah 1987), supports his view. The dispositive fact in 
Galloway, in this Court's own words, was: 
At the time the appeal was taken, Plaintiffs' 
cause of action against AFCO and Affleck had 
not been resolved and therefore remained 
pending. 
744 P.2d at 1366. In C84-4355, the cause of action against Bagel 
Nosh (for unlawful detainer) had been resolved by, the Court's 
ruling that the Lease remained in effect. No claim against Bagel 
Nosh remained pending after the Judgment against Landes was 
entered. 
In Galloway, this Court concluded that due to the pending 
unresolved claims against AFCO and Affleck, the Judgment against 
Mangum was not appealable "in the absence of a proper 
certification by the trial court". The burden of seeking 
certification of a non-final judgment must necessarily fall on 
the party desiring to appeal. Nothing prevented Landes from 
seeking certification, if he felt the Judgment was non-final. He 
simply elected not to and chose instead to pay the Judgment. 
Under such circumstances, his contending now that the Judgment 
was not "final" is, in a word, nonsense. 
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ARGUMENT VIII 
ALTHOUGH SATISFACTION OF THE PRIOR JUDGMENT 
SHOULD HAVE FORECLOSED LANDES FROM PRESENTING 
HIS DEFENSES TO LIABILITY UNDER THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT TO LEASE, THE DISTRICT COURT ALLOWED 
LANDES TO MAKE HIS ARGUMENTS. THEY WERE, HOWEVER, 
UNCOMPELLING. 
As explained in the preceding arguments and authorities, 
the District Court was correct in its application of the 
doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. The District 
Court stated the matter with simple, forceful logic in its 
memorandum decision: 
The court cannot envision any greater 
finality of a judgment than a party foregoing 
its right to appeal ... and paying the 
judgment in full. When defendant Landes 
satisfied the Judgment, he gave up his right 
to appeal and the satisfaction of the judgment 
in the prior action now precludes defendant 
Landes from asserting defenses to this action 
because the defenses are barred by the 
doctrines of res adjudicata and collateral 
estoppel. 
(R. 686). 
Despite the District Court's summary judgment ruling, 
when the case finally went to trial, Landes' counsel was given full 
opportunity to litigate and argue the two defenses to liability he 
identifies on page 35 of his brief. No restrictions were placed 
on him- The Court noted this free rein in its memorandum 
decision following the trial: 
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20c The court, despite its previous rulings 
not to allow defendant to raise certain 
defenses to this action, did allow 
defendants to raise the defenses and present 
evidence in support thereof 
(Re 726-7) (See also Finding of Fact No- 17, R. 752). 
For these reasons and reasons set forth in the preceding 
points in this brief, Landes' Argument VIII is without merit. 
ARGUMENT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT LANDES 
HAD GUARANTEED THE LEASE BECAUSE, INTER ALIA, CUMULATIVE 
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF LANDES1 AGREEMENT TO GUARANTEE 
THE LEASE MAKES THE EXECUTION OR NON-EXECUTION OF THE 
SEPARATE GUARANTEE FORM (Exhibit "C" to First Amendment 
to Lease) IMMATERIAL. 
The Trial Court correctly found that Landes' liability as 
guarantor was judicially established in the prior case (C84-4355) 
and therefore not subject to relitigation in this case. Landesf 
guarantor status is a "thing decided". Although beyond contest 
now, the thing was decided correctly for reasons including the 
following. 
Landes signed the First Amendment to Lease. He does not 
dispute that. Exhibit "C" thereto, whether signed or unsigned, 
is mere surplusage. The signed First Amendment to Lease embodies 
Landes' guarantee. 
Paragraph 2 expressly amends Article I of the underlying 
Lease by adding after the words "name of guarantor" the names of 
Seftel and Landes (see Exhibit 3-P). Paragraph 8 of the document 
expressly incorporates into the Lease a new section, Section 
29.19, expressly naming Landes and Seftel as personal guarantors 
of the Lease. (Id.). 
Following the execution of the First Amendment to Lease on 
July 15, 1981, Olympus Hills allowed Bagel Nosh to remain in the 
premises, despite its substantial default. Unquestionably, 
Olympus Hills had grounds and motive to evict its tenant at that 
time. The guarantee of Landes and Seftel provided the critical 
consideration for allowing the Bagel Nosh Lease to remain in 
effect. Olympus Hills1 general partner testified that it was his 
understanding that in signing the First Amendment to Lease, 
Landes had personally guaranteed the tenant's obligations. (TR. 
19-20). Landes chose not to appear at trial and therefore could 
not be questioned as to his understanding. 
However, his understanding is amply reflected in his actions. 
Landes acknowledged his having guaranteed the Lease when he 
acquiesced in the entry of judgment against him for unpaid 
past-due rent in C84-4355. He further acknowledged it by 
paying the Judgment and by later paying ongoing rent obligations 
on behalf of Bagel Nosh. (R. 195-199). Further acknowledgment of 
his continuing liability is found in his attorney's September 9, 
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1985 letter indicating that Landes and Seftel "would like to be 
released from their obligations under the Lease". (R. 379). 
The First Amendment to Lease binds Landes as a guarantor, 
irrespective of the execution or non-execution of Exhibit "C" 
thereto. Landes1 own actions acknowledge this to be so* 
ARGUMENT X 
STEPS TAKEN IN THE PRIOR SUIT TO HAVE BAGEL NOSH 
DECLARED IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER DID NOT TERMINATE 
THE LEASE OR LANDES1 GUARANTOR OBLIGATIONS. 
A. Neither Service of the Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate 
Nor the Filing of Olympus Hills' Complaint in the 
Prior Suit Effected a Termination of the Lease, and 
Landes* own Actions Manifest an Acknowledgment that 
the Lease Remained in Effect. 
Landes argues that the Lease was terminated in July of 1984 
when the tenant and the guarantor failed to comply with Olympus 
Hills1 Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate. Landes' contention that 
Olympus Hills' preliminary notice became self-executing in 
terminating the contractual relationship between the parties is 
absurd. 
If Landes' contention had any merit, the Lease would have 
been terminated three years earlier when the tenant failed to 
comply with Olympus Hills' first Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or 
Vacate. After Bagel Nosh failed to comply with that Notice 
(served March 3, 1981), Olympus Hills filed an Unlawful Detainer 
Action to evict Bagel Nosh, C81-3101. As Landes well knows, 
however, the Lease was not then terminated. In settlement of the 
suit, the parties entered into the July 15, 1981 First Amendment 
to Lease, which allowed the tenant to remain in possession, 
despite the unpaid rent arrearage, in exchange for Landes and 
Seftel guaranteeing future payments under the Lease. All this 
is set forth in the preamble to the First Amendment to Lease. 
(Exhibit 3-P). 
Three years later, Olympus Hills again served a Three Day 
Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate. When it was not honored, Olympus 
Hills again filed suit to evict the tenant. As in the former 
instance, settlement was reached under which the Lease was 
allowed to remain in effect. That settlement is embodied in the 
stipulation filed with the Bankruptcy Court. (R. 171-175). 
Landes himself made subsequent rent payments under that 
stipulation to assure that the Lease would remain in effect and 
not be terminated. (R. 195-199). Landes1 contention that the 
Lease was terminated in July of 1984 is therefore ludicrous. 
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B. No Utah Case Holds or Even Suggests that an Uncomplied-
With Alternative Notice to Pay or Quit Operates as a 
Self-Executing Termination of a Lease. 
Landes claims non-liability as a lease guarantor on the 
ground that the Lease was terminated by Bagel Noshfs 
non-compliance with Olympus Hills1 July, 1984 Notice to Pay Rent 
or Vacate. This contention is inconsistent with the authorities 
Landes claims support it. 
None of the Utah cases cited by Landes in his Argument X 
holds or even suggests that Landes' proposition is true. In 
fact, the cases support a contrary conclusion. They are 
considered below in the order they appear in Landes' brief. 
In Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852 (Utah 1979), this Court 
simply affirmed the trial court's finding that the landlord's 
notice was defective and his unlawful detainer action was not 
maintainable. The case has no relevance here. 
In Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982), this Court 
actually held that a landlord's letter notifying his tenant of 
termination of the lease did not terminate the lease. In dictum, 
the court stated that "a forfeiture of the lease may result by 
virtue of a clause in the lease providing for forfeiture in case 
of breach of covenant or condition". However, the court did not 
suggest that such a forfeiture is an automatic result of a 
breach. Instead, the court said: "where such is clearly provided 
for, the courts will generally enforce it". 657 P.2d at 1275 
(emphasis added). The critical point is that whether a tenant is 
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in unlawful detainer or a lease has been terminated are legal 
conclusions which only a court can make. In the case of Bagel 
Nosh's Lease, no court found Bagel Nosh in unlawful detainer or 
the Lease terminated. On the contrary, Judge Wilkinson expressly 
found that the Lease was still in effect long after service of 
the Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate. 
Dang v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658 (Utah 1982), also does not 
support Landes' theory of automatic, self-executing lease 
termination by service of notice. In Dang, as in the other 
cases, this Court actually held that the tenant was not in 
unlawful detainer because the notice was defective. This court 
also found that the notice did not effectuate a forfeiture of the 
lease. On page 662, this Court points out a critical distinction 
between a notice of forfeiture (or termination) of a lease and a 
notice of unlawful detainer. The former "simply declares a 
termination of the lease without giving the lessee the 
alternative of making up the deficiency". This court then states: 
It would be anomalous to find that a notice 
which gives the option of performance also 
serves as a notice of forfeiture, which by 
definition does not give that option. 
655 P.2d at 662. The July, 1984 Notice on which Landes attempts 
to rely did not declare that the Lease was being terminated. 
Whether a notice which does unequivocally purport to terminate a 
lease is self-executing without judicial affirmance is a 
question which has no relevance to the case at bar. 
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Lincoln Financial Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P.2d 1102 (Utah 1977), 
is also unsupportive of Landes' contention. That case involved a 
month-to-month tenancy agreement providing that either party 
could terminate by giving 15 days' written notice to the other 
party. There again, the notice was not an alternative notice to 
perform or vacate, but simply a notice that the tenancy was over. 
The tenant's performance or non-performance was not at issue. 
The landlord had unequivocally indicated that he had cancelled 
and terminated the rental contract. In C84-4355, Olympus Hills 
made no express cancellation or termination of Bagel Nosh's Lease. 
Judge Wilkinson actually found that the Lease had not been 
terminated. 
In Jacobson v. Swan, 278 P.2d 294 (Utah 1954), the Court 
again had under consideration an unconditional notice to quit, 
not an alternative notice to pay or quit. The notice 
unconditionally declared the lease agreement terminated. That 
case is therefore inapposite. Finally, Landes seeks reversal on 
the basis of In Re Maxwell, 40 B.R. 231 (Bkrtcy. D.C. 111. 1984). 
That case is of no help to this Court because it was decided 
under Illinois law. Whether the sending of a five day notice and 
filing suit for possession terminates a lease under Illinois law 
has no bearing in this case. This Court interprets and follows 
Utah law, not Illinois law. 
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C. In Utah, a Lease Allegedly Breached for Non-Payment of 
Rent is not Terminated Until a Court Declares it so. The 
Judgment in C84-4355 Precludes any Court from Declaring 
the Bagel Nosh Lease Terminated as of July, 1984. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that a lease is not 
terminated for non-payment until a Court declares it so. See, 
e.g. In Re Fountainebleau, 515 F.2d. 913 (5th Cir. 1975); Lemoine 
v. Devillier, 189 So.2d 694 (La. 1966). However, the search for 
case authorities on this point is somewhat of a wild goose chase 
because Utah's Unlawful Detainer Statute contains language 
dispositive of the issue. The statute makes clear that a lease 
allegedly breached for non-payment of rent is terminated by 
judicial declaration, not a party's allegation. 
Section 78-36-10, Utah Code Ann., addresses the entry of 
judgment after an unlawful detainer trial won by an evicting 
landlord. Subsection 1 states: 
If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer 
after ... default in the payment of rent, the 
judgment shall also [in addition to ordering 
restitution] declare the forfeiture of the 
lease or agreement, (emphasis added). 
The chief purpose of the Unlawful Detainer Act is to 
discourage self-help in the area of landlord-tenant dealings and 
to place the resolution of lease disputes with the court. The 
parties are to seek redress in the courts. The termination of a 
lease is to be declared by the court. The statute itself so 
states. 
Here, Judge Wilkinson's Judgment in C84-4355 made it 
-62-
impossible for him or any other judge to declare the Bagel Nosh 
Lease terminated as of July, 1984. 
Do Landes Failed to Plead his Novel Assertion that the July, 
1984 Notice to Pay or Vacate Terminated the Lease. He 
therefore Waived such Defense, 
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a 
defending party to set forth affirmatively "any ... matter 
constituting an avoidance or an affirmative defense". Under 
12(a), a party waives all defenses and objections which he does 
not present "either by motion as herein before provided [i.e. in 
a pre-answer motion to dismiss] or, if he has made no motion, in 
his answer or reply". 
Landes1 theory that he is not liable as a guarantor of the 
Lease because the Lease was terminated in July of 1984 would, if 
true, constitute an avoidance or affirmative defense to Olympus 
Hills1 action. By failing to plead it in his answer, Landes 
waived it. 
ARGUMENT XI 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT LANDES PAID 
THE PRIOR JUDGMENT "INVOLUNTARILY". MOREOVER, LANDES 
COULD HAVE APPEALED, BUT CHOSE NOT TO. 
Landes acknowledges the general rule that one who acquiesces 
in a judgment by paying it cannot later attack that judgment. 
However, he cites Idaho case law for the proposition that the 
general rule does not apply when payment of the judgment is 
"involuntary". Even in Idaho, the alleged exception to the 
general rule has been accorded limited, narrow application. See 
Bob Rice Ford, Inc. v. Donnelly, 563 P.2d 37 (Ida. 1977). In 
fact, in People ex rel. Neilson v. Wilkins, 614 P.2d 417 (Ida. 
1980), the Idaho Supreme Court noted: 
It is a matter of law that a party who does 
"anything which savors of acquiescence in a 
judgment cuts off the right of appellate 
review" (citations omitted). 
614 P.2d at 419. 
There is no evidence that Landes paid the prior judgment 
under duress or "involuntarily". No execution sale was scheduled 
at the time Landes chose to confess judgment in New York and 
propose his payment plan. Landes simply desired to prevent damage 
to his reputation in New York and to pay the Judgment on his own 
terms. It is noteworthy that Landes' voluntary Affidavit for 
Judgment by Confession was signed on August 7, 1985 - nearly 
eight months after the Utah Judgment was entered. (R. 188). His 
appeal right had lapsed long before then. 
Landes approved the Judgment which he now claims should 
have no res judicata effect. (R. 178). He made no attempt 
to set it aside. He made no attempt to appeal from it or, if 
he felt appeal required certification under Rule 54(b), to 
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request such certification. In short, he slept on his rights. 
Landes' conduct is very similar to the government's conduct 
in United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). 
There, the government sought to avoid the effect of a prior 
judgment, although it had taken no action to vacate it. The 
District Court ruled that the prior judgment was res judicata. 
Both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed. The 
concluding paragraph of the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Munsingwear is apropos here: 
The case is therefore one where the United 
States, having slept on its rights, now asks 
us to do what by orderly procedure it could 
have done for itself. The case illustrates 
not the hardship of res judicata but the need 
for it in providing terminal points for 
litigation. 
340 U.S. at 41. 
ARGUMENT XII 
THE FILING OF THE POST-TRIAL AFFIDAVIT ATTEMPTING 
TO INFORM THE TRIAL COURT OF A UTAH BANKRUPTCY 
JUDGE'S VIEW ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW QUESTION 
RAISED BY LANDES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BECAUSE: 1) THERE IS NO INDICATION THE 
COURT CONSIDERED IT; 2) THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
WAS BASED ON OTHER GROUNDS; 3) THE AFFIDAVIT 
CONCERNED A MATTER OF LAW, NOT OF FACT; AND 
4) THE AFFIDAVIT CONTAINED NO MORE HEARSAY 
THAN MR. LETA'S TESTIMONY. 
Contrary to Landes1 assertion, his argument that his 
obligations under the Lease were terminated by Bagel Nosh's 
alleged deemed "rejection" of the Lease under bankruptcy law was 
-65-
first raised at the time of trial. Nowhere in the voluminous 
memoranda Landes filed before and after the summary judgment 
hearing did he raise that contention. Although Landes1 counsel 
listed attorney David Leta as a witness, he did not disclose what 
Mr. Leta's testimony would be. At trial, Olympus Hills objected 
to the Court allowing Mr. Leta to testify, arguing that the 
defense Landes was attempting to assert through Mr. Leta had not 
been pleaded, that Leta's testimony was an unfair surprise, and 
that Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not allow expert 
testimony on law, but only on fact. (TR. 203-207, 208). Over 
Olympus Hills' objection, Mr. Leta was allowed to testify. 
In this case, the submission of post-hearing and post-trial 
memoranda, court opinions and letters was the rule, not the 
exception. Both counsel indulged in the practice. (R. 228-321; 
613, 614; 615-625; 701-703; 713, 714-715, 716-717). Following 
the trial, Landes' own counsel submitted to the Court a lengthy 
letter and a copy of a bankruptcy decision in an effort to 
persuade the Court that the law on the bankruptcy point in 
question was as he contended it was. (R. 692-699). 
The submission of the Rainey affidavit was not, as Landes 
asserts, "ex parte". On the same day the affidavit was submitted 
to the Court, a copy was hand delivered to Landes1 counsel. (R. 
703) . 
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There is no indication anywhere in the record that Judge 
Rokich considered the Rainey affidavit or that his decision was 
based on it. 
To the contrary, Judge Rokich made it very clear at trial 
that he considered the bankruptcy issue to be immaterial• He 
stated on the record his understanding that the bankruptcy 
debtor's "rejection" of the Lease would not affect the 
guarantor's liability regardless of whether such rejection was 
deemed a breach or a termination of the Lease. He based this 
understanding on the testimony of Landes1 own expert. Landes1 
counsel endorsed as accurate Judge Rokich1s understanding* (TR. 
240, 267; 237-8; See also Argument IV, supra). 
To the extent that the bankruptcy law question raised by 
Landes was of any interest to Judge Rokich, he should have been 
free to consult any source as to what the law is. If he 
considered it appropriate to receive counsel on the law from Mr. 
Leta, this Court should not consider reversible error an attempt 
to present to Judge Rokich the view of one of Utah's own 
bankruptcy judges on the same point of law. 
It is true that Ms. Raineyfs affidavit contains hearsay. 
However, the information contained in Ms. Rainey's affidavit is 
hardly more hearsay than Mr. Leta's own testimony, which 
consisted of telling the trial court what courts across the 
country have said on the point in question. Such "testimony" 
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is just as much hearsay as Ms. Rainey's report of what Utah's 
bankruptcy judge had said on the issue. 
If determination of the bankruptcy question raised by Landes 
really is important to a disposition of this case (and the trial 
court found that it wasn't), this Court can decide that question 
from its own analysis based on any legal authorities available to 
it. The trial court's possible consideration of an authority 
contained in an allegedly inappropriate affidavit is no ground 
for reversal. If this Court finds the law to be as indicated in 
the Rainey affidavit, submission of the affidavit at worst was 
harmless error. If this Court finds the law to be otherwise, it 
may so declare, without even ruling on the propriety of the 
Rainey affidavit. 
Landes' appeal may be decided without this Court having to 
address either the bankruptcy law issue or the propriety of the 
Rainey affidavit. Both issues are immaterial and this Court 
should so find. 
ARGUMENT XIII 
LANDES' ARGUMENT THIRTEEN IS FRIVOLOUS AND 
ILLUSTRATES HIS PROPENSITY TO MISSTATE FACTS 
AND GRASP AT MERITLESS TECHNICALITIES. 
In his Argument Thirteen, Landes argues that the District Court 
committed prejudicial error when it refused to strike six 
exhibits attached to Olympus Hills' summary judgment memorandum. 
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In support of his argument, Landes represents to this Court that 
his own Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on September 15, 
1988, and that Olympus Hills' affidavit authenticating the 
exhibits Landes sought to exclude was not filed until October 13, 
the date the District Court ruled on the cross motions for 
summary judgment. These representations are untrue. More 
importantly, the argument they supposedly support is groundless. 
A* The Six Exhibits Landes1 Claims to be "Uncertified" Were 
Authenticated Nearly a Month Before the District Court 
Granted Olympus Hills' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
A true chronology of the events preceding the District 
Court's ruling on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment 
may be helpful to this Court. It will also illustrate the modus 
operandi of Landes' counsel. 
Landes filed his Motion for Summary Judgment and his 
Memorandum, containing 42 pages of arguments and exhibits, on 
September 8. (R. 366; 323-365). He caused these documents to be 
hand delivered to opposing counsel on that same day, thereby 
denying Olympus Hills the additional three days of preparation 
allowed under the rules when service is effected by mail. (R. 
367; 343). The following day - September 9 - he filed a Notice 
of Hearing indicating that his Motion for Summary Judgment would 
be heard on Monday, September 19 - just ten days later. 
-69-
The schedule thus set up by Landes allowed Olympus Hills 
precious little time to respond to Landes1 lengthy Memorandum. 
Olympus Hills filed a Cross Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on September 12. On September 15, it filed its 
Memorandum, with the six exhibits in question attached. 
The following day - a Friday - Landes filed his Motion to 
Strike. A copy was served on Olympus Hills1 counsel late Friday 
afternoon. This gave Olympus Hills only the weekend to respond 
to the Motion to Strike before the Monday hearing. 
Olympus Hills' affidavit authenticating the exhibits Landes 
wanted to keep the Court from considering is dated September 19 
(R. 376) and was submitted to the Court and opposing counsel at 
the beginning of oral argument on that date. 
Undoubtedly because Judge Rokich kept the file in his 
chambers from the time of the hearing until he rendered his 
decision nearly a month later, the first page of the affidavit 
bears an October 13 filing stamp. It was not until then 
that the affidavit could have been logged in by the court clerk. 
Proof that the affidavit was submitted to the Court and opposing 
counsel earlier than October 13 can be found in the fact that a 
copy of the affidavit appears as an attachment to a discovery 
pleading filed by Landes* attorney on October 3! (See R. 215, 216 
(para. 3), and 219-24). Further circumstantial evidence can be 
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found in the fact that Landes1 own September 8 motion and 
memorandum for summary judgment also bear the October 13 stamp of 
the Clerk of the Court! Surely Landes does not expect this Court 
to believe that his summary judgment papers were not filed until 
the day the Court ruled on them. 
Having orchestrated an unfairly short pre-hearing briefing 
schedule, Landes should be censured for misrepresenting to the 
Court the dates on which the pleadings were filed. His Argument 
Thirteen should be rejected as groundless. The exhibits were 
timely authenticated. 
B. The Authenticity of the Exhibits, in any Event, is 
Uncontestable, Particularly by Landes. 
The six exhibits in question hardly require authentication. 
The first was a stipulation filed in the Bankruptcy Court. It 
was executed by an attorney who represented Landes1 Bagel Nosh 
Restaurant. It is a public record of which the Court could take 
judicial notice. 
The second exhibit was a copy of the Judgment entered by 
Judge Wilkinson in the prior suit (C84-4355). Landes actually 
submitted identical copies of that Judgment as attachments to 
his own memoranda (R. 323, 353-4; 584-5), and so has no standing 
to complain of the Court's consideration of it. 
The third exhibit is the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law supporting Judge Wilkinson's Judgment. Like the Judgment, it 
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bears the signature of Landes' own counsel - the very attorney 
who argues that the exhibit should have been stricken as 
"uncertified". Moreover, the District Court could well take 
judicial notice of the findings and conclusions since they are of 
public record. 
The fourth exhibit is an Affidavit for Judgment by Confession 
executed by Landes himself. If Landes contested the authenticity 
of this exhibit, he could simply have said so. He did not. 
The fifth exhibit is a copy of the First Amendment to Lease. 
Again, Landes has no standing to object to the Court's 
consideration of that document because he submitted an identical 
copy himself. (R. 356-359). 
The sixth exhibit consists of copies of three checks drawn on 
Daniel W. Jackson's client trust account, together with two 
transmittal letters from Mr. Jackson dated April 29 and May 1, 
1985, respectively. If Mr. Jackson wished to deny that he signed 
these letters and issued these checks, he could simply have said 
so. He did not. 
Landes and his counsel should be ashamed for including 
Argument Thirteen in their appeal brief. The argument should be 
summarily rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of collateral estoppel is to prevent relitigation 
of issues once decided. The purpose of res judicata is to bar 
claims and assertions which could have been made in prior 
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litigation between the parties. The purpose of judicial estoppel 
is to bar a litigant from telling one court one thing and another 
court another thing. All three doctrines are intended to provide 
"terminal points for litigation". Allowing Landes to contest 
his liability as a lease guarantor would do violence to these 
doctrines, reward disingenuity and effectively render void the 
Judgment, Findings and Conclusions entered in C84-4355. The 
District Court was correct in granting summary judgment to 
Olympus Hills and limiting the trial solely to an issue of how 
much money Landes owed under his obligations as guarantor of the 
Lease. 
Olympus Hills has suffered much since it agreed in 1981 to 
keep the Bagel Nosh lease in force in exchange for Landes1 
agreement to guarantee Bagel Nosh's performance. Landes should 
not be allowed to cause further grief and hardship by contesting 
matters which have already been decided or by raising defenses 
and claims he chose not to raise at earlier opportunities. Under 
the law, Landes1 liability as a guarantor is a "thing decided". 
The decision was decided correctly in the first place and should 
not be undone. 
Compelling evidence was presented to the trial court that 
Olympus Hills took commercially reasonable steps to mitigate its 
losses. The trial court's award of $75,000.00 for loss of 
rentals was conservative in light of the evidence that Olympus 
Hills' rent losses totalled $134,424.88. The award should be 
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upheld. 
The trial court's awa^d <*-r ?! ^ orm- , "?. fees was appropriate. 
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reject the Lease. Even if it had, the better view among 
bankruptcy courts across the country is that such a rejection 
would constitute merely a breach, not a termination, of the lease, 
The whole point i$ immaterial, however, as far as a non-bankrupt 
guarantor is concerned. 
The other arguments raised by Landes on appeal are, on close 
inspection, either patently absurd or immaterial. 
The District Court's Judgment should be affirmed and Olympus 
Hills should be awarded its reasonable attorney's fees incurred 
in defending against Landes' Appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this O H\ day of February, 1990. 
Douqlasr G. Mortens^ en g c 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. 
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ADDENDA 
Order Denying Defendant Landes1 Motloi 1 
for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike 
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Summary Judgment (dated November I4, 1988) 
Judgment (dated May 26, 1989) 
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DOUGLAS G. MORTENSEN #2329 
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER, 
a Utah Limited Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SIDNEY SEFTEL and MIKE LANDES, 
aka MICHAEL S.' LANDES, 
Defendants. 
LTD. , > ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 
> LANDES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
> JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO STRI1 
} AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
) MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. C85-7821 
1 (Judge John A. Rokich) 
Defendant Mike Landes1 Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came on regularly 
for hearing before the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge of the 
above-entitled Court on Monday, September 19, 1988 at 2:30 P.M. 
Douglas G. Mortensen appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Olympus 
Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. Daniel W. Jackson appeared on behalf 
of Defendant Mike Landes, aka Michael S. Landes. The Court read 
and considered the memoranda, exhibits and affidavits submitted 
on behalf of the litigants and heard the arguments of counsel. 
The Court also read Defendant Landes1 Motion to Strike and heard 
argument concerning it. After full argument on the pending 
motions, the Court requested further briefing. Thereafter, 
post-hearing memoranda, letters and Court opinions were submitted 
to the Court. Based on the Court's careful consideration of all 
such submissions and good cause appearing: 
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John-\A. Rokich, Distribt Court Judge 
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Attorney for Defendant, Landes 
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DOUGLAS G. MORTENSEN, #2329 
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER, 
LTD., a Utah Limited Partnership 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
SYDNEY SEFTEL AND MIKE LANDES, 
aka MICHAEL S. LANDES, ] 
Defendants. 1 
) JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. C85-7821 
' (Judge John A, F.okich) 
This case came on for trial on February 9th and 10th, 1989. 
Planitiff was present through its general partner, Richard S. 
Skankey, and was represented by its counsel, Douglas G. 
Mortensen. Defendant Sydney Seftel was not present, having filed 
bankruptcy during the pendency of this action prior to trial. 
Defendant Michael S. Landes was also absent, but was represented 
by his counsel, Daniel W. Jackson. The Court heard the testimony 
of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence, heard and considered 
oral argument and took the matter under advisement. Based on all 
of the evidence and all of the memoranda and other written 
arguments submitted herein, and further based on the Court's 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered herein, 
and good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
Plaintiff Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd 
is he \ ^i -VA-: .- • : • 
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Dated this _ , _ day of May, 5 89, 
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i n 
-; u »f: i 
.^ i arm 
John* A. Rokich 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form,.: 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Attorney for Defendant Michael Landes 
T.. .;'. v^-.w.ci D-.strsct 
DOUGLAS G. MORTENSEN, #2329 
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telechone: (801) 363-2244 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER, 
LTD., a Utah Limited Partnership 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SYDNEY SEFTEL AND MIKE LANDES, aka ' 
MICHAEL S. LANDES, 
Defendants. ] 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. C85-7 821 
) (Judge John A. Rckich) 
.his case came on for trial on February 9th and 10th, 19 89* 
Planiuiff was present through its general partner, Richard S. 
Skankey, and was represented by its counsel, Douglas G. 
Mcrter.sen. Defendant Sydney Seftel was not present, having filed 
bankruptcy during the pendency of this action prior to trial. 
Defendant Michael S. Landes was also absent, but was represented 
by his counsel, Daniel W. Jackson* The Court heard the testimony 
of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence, heard and considered 
oral argument and took the matter under advisement. Having 
considered all of the evidence and all of the memoranda and other 
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written submissions, and good cause appearing, the court now 
enter s i ts: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Several morrr-
 r * .- * • - -r-.
3
. defendant Landes filed a 
Motion for Summary - :.:J::^: I . . - ' - .- ..ereafter, Plalnti .ff filed 
a Motion for Partial Summary Judgmenr ssues presented oy 
these E;re i n ten si ve] \ •-•-.-.•- • .-
argued. In Ncvenrer I- ' '-*'* *: > ilcu: .emea defendant Landes" 
v
*ouior --^  Summarv Judcment and r^.ir* • : r ' '•"*";ff"s rio* 
• -.= : :r::.-i - *g."*-u express" :
 Ai , .: , . ..ic^cant Landes to wt: 
•uaranto: - i . : c a : : c n F • Bagel N^sh Holdirc rr>rr - -
preir.se :a .:iro'.k *:..-, Shopping C e n t e r .ccateo -' 
Was arc*" 3cu_eva v" r r*". I : • :• ' * ~- ^vf. '"^ ui L ruj.ec tuP:^ *• • - * u 
• u . .^: ;. ^ amoxir: : L^.eLCar.t 
Landes' liability t'r r ;> i.- ir : - * her t'.argec accruing un .^ r 
Bagel Mesh Lease. 
2. Plaint i ff ^rd Barrel Mesh HolcMnc CA^r, QT^^T^CI -~*-~ 
Lease Agreement for -.• v.*;-- : - yea: * rir, <-v< ""' rppibp: 19 *-"" r 
3. C -. 
executed ;( ;;.jie::' *-: ' :*".--<: •: - sr A^er^imenr lease 
document provided for a g uarantee <f che Lease, Defendants Seftel 
and Landes execut-;-.: the Fi rst Amendment to Lease as guarantors of 
the Lease. as .-mended, Ii i signing the First Amendment to Leas**, 
D e f e n c -" "V- f - 2 ] a n d I a 11 < :I e s p e r s o n a ] ] 1 g 1 a 1: a 1:11 e e d t: I: 1 e • t e: 
_ 2 -
the amended Lease. The First Amendment to Lease refers to a 
separate "guarantee" set forth as Exhibit "C" to the First 
Amendment to Lease. Neither the Plaintiff nor Defendant Landes 
was able to produce the "Exhibit C" at trial. 
4. Plaintiff initiated legal action against Defendants 
Landes and Seftel in 1984 and obtained judgments against them in 
the sums of $30,710.70 and $5,457.93, respectively, for past-due 
rent and other sums due. That action was Case No. C84-4255. 
5* The judgments entered in C84-4255 were satisfied by the 
Defendants. 
6. The Defendants did not take an appeal from either of the 
judgments entered in C84-4255. They later contended in this case 
that those judgments were non-appealable because all claims 
against all of the parties were not adjudicated in Case No. C84-
4255. 
7. This Court found that the Defendants precluded themselves 
from taking an appeal from said judgments by paying and satisfying 
such judgments and not ever raising the appealability issue until 
this proceeding. 
8c_ Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. filed for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. 
9. The bankrupt company was doing business as Bagel Nosh 
Olympus Hills. 
10. The exact date that Bagel Nosh vacated the Olympus Hills 
premises is unknown. 
-3-
11. The tenant, Bagel Nosh, discontinued doing business in 
the ,r:-^s^6 p r e m i s e , but cO "I . •• items of its personal orccertv t:o 
remain in and upon the premises for some time after : \ ceased 
actively conducting business there. 
l,: 1 o P 1 a i i '. L :: :>.-.• - e.:.,.'..: i -L- • t < - e a s e c p r e n: i i s e s :i i :i J i 11 i e o f 1 9 8 6 
for the purpose of attempting to relet the premises. 
13 The p.] - • •- - ix € not i estor ed to the original condition, 
reasonable wear rinc teai excepted. 
.1 4 Plaintif f a11eir.pted to re 1 et the prem,ises ,  but refused to 
r e 1 e t f e r a s h o r t t e r in. c i: t: o a f * n: i : n t a i i < :I p o p'' c p e i a t i o n. 
15. Plaintiff had opportunities to lease the premises for a 
s h c i: t t e rm s i i c 1 i a s 11 i i: = e ;  e a i: s t o a '" m o m and p o p n o p e r a t i o n , b u t 
t h e p r o s p e c t i v e "! m o m a n d p o p': t e n a n t s d I d n o t m e e t P1 a i n t i f f " s 
criteria. 
• .. -.--r t:=*•_-. ]:: • i : > v i de s f c • i a 11:c i: ne} ' s f e e s t: • :: b e 
awarded f o tr-: /-uccessful party in an action filed in relation to 
the Lease. 
> n r t ;.^ sc;i>:~ ts previ-j- •; v 
Defendan* to :.-:.:-«- defenses which were c r-ulc have bee*" raised 
i * ' -r • - - : "r such 
defenses and present evide:c^ . : appc.L thereof. 
1 8 v The riaintiii is ent^' •-o ~\~ ^;i for damages ":o 
restore ^h^ premises, toaether v ;• .t:-.-:- ...-.*• * . e 
of ten percent per annuni from June 7 , 19 8 6. 
-4-
19. Plaintiff is entitled to $75,000 in damages for loss of 
rentals from June 7, 1985 through June 7, 1987 at the rate of 
$3,126.16 per month, together vith interest on the accruing amount 
thereof at the rate of ten percent per annum. The total 
prejudgment interest on this element of damage through May, 19 89 
is $22,815.00. 
20. Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees of $16,667, 
together with its costs incurred in this action. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff had a valid and existing Lease with Bagel Nosh 
Holding Corp. 
2. Defendant Landes and Seftel guaranteed the Tenant's 
performance of the terms and conditions of the Lease. 
3. Neither the filing of the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
proceeding by Bagel Nosh Intermcuntain, Ltd., dba Bagel Nosh 
Olympus Hills, nor Bagel Nosh's subsequent ''rejection" of the 
Lease terminated the Lease. 
4* The Bagel Nosh bankruptcy proceedings did not affect the 
obligations of the non-bankrupt guarantor or guarantors. 
5. The Plaintiff did not use its best efforts to relet the 
premises. 
-5-
c rn\,p plaintiff :s ent'fle.- ' --.-—- r , damages to 
restore T r>- premises, l:^aether *> nh Ir "erest inereon at • *-<? . v ~ 
Of .r" ,- . -' 
Plaintiff ent i t led • . $"": • damages for loss of 
rentals from . * * -
 t e r a t e of 
$ 3 , l i 6 o ~ 6 p e r u ^ n t r , ; . i , c e t i , e r w : t ir t e r e s * v ; - r e a c c r u i n g a m o u n t 
t h e r e o f -• " *- r a r e * *-. r. e r v?r - u e : a ' '.-^ Tin ^t a l 
p r e j u d g m e n t i r i t e i e b l . ,M" \ b i s e l e m e n t oi; d a m a g e t h r o u g h Na / , 1V^9 
i s $ 2 2 , 8 1 5 . 0 0 
8 . ? l a : . n t i £ t : - ' 7 , 
t o g e t h e r •*..;... ; * - S ^ . O . O , . ^ , u i ^ . : r ; *ir . * - . 
D a t e d t h i s ^ <: d a y o f H a y , 19 8 9 . 
By t h e C o u r t : 
John A. Rokich 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to ^^ 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Attorney for Defendant Michae] S, Landes 
-6-
